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NEW WINE BOTTLES: RETHINKING POLITICAL AND
JUDICIAL CONTROLS ON ADMINISTRATION
YVETrE M.

BARKSDALE*

I found this task of commenting on the works in this symposium
engaging. The perspectives provided here are a fascinating snapshot
of administrative law scholarship today and its groping steps toward a
newer understanding of the perennial problem of the place of administrative agencies in government. What struck me most about this
scholarship was its patent dissatisfaction with contemporary models of
administration, and in particular with the fallout from the left-right
battles of the Reagan and Bush and early Clinton years over the administrative state. The scholarship in this symposium edges warily
away from these battles of the 1980s and early 1990s towards new conceptualizations of administration which favor legislative or administrative controls on administration over normative executive, judicial, or
public participatory ones.
The work here ranges from historical work which reassesses postNew Deal administrative law theory,' to jurisprudential work which
reconceptualizes the relationship between administrative agencies and
politics, 2 to structural work which reconceptualizes the politics of administrative agency decisionmaking. 3 Even the classic doctrinal scholarship also fills new wine bottles by looking to legislative or
4
administrative models in its conception of judicial review.
The historical pieces focus on the legal community's understanding of the peculiar nature of administrative law decisionmaking: the
neither fish nor fowl blend of law, policy, and politics. Two of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. I would like to thank the
Chicago-Kent Law Review and Professor Harold Krent for inviting me to participate in this
symposium.

1. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1039
(1997); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Jaffe's Law: An Essay on the Intellectual Underpinningsof Modern
Administrative Law Theory, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1159 (1997); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal
Profession and the Development of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119 (1997).
2. See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENr L. REV. 987 (1997); Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and its Discontents,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1299 (1997).

3. See Peter L. Strauss, PresidentialRulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965 (1997).
4. See Harold J. Krent, Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with PriorRules and
Regulations, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1187 (1997); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron:
Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997).
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three historical commentators, Thomas Merrill and Daniel Rodriguez,
discuss the rise and fall of the courts' enchantment with judicial review
as a method of control of administration. Merrill ascribes the twentieth century history of judicial review of administrative decisionmaking
to a judicial move away from (1) an early post-New Deal conception
of administration as "public interested," rational, and pure, to (2) a
1960s Great Society hands-on conception of administration as corrupt,
captured, and inefficient, to (3) a recent hands-more-or-less-off cynical
conception of administration as merely another cog in the systemically
5
pathological rent-seeking wheel of political democracy.
Daniel Rodriguez follows by highlighting the work of Louis Jaffe
as a principal example of the "move" from the "hands-off" judicial
review of the early post-New Deal era to the more intensive judicial
review of the Great Society era of the 1960s and 1970s. 6 Rodriguez
argues that underlying the enhanced judicial intervention in the administrative state was a Jaffe-esque conception of administrative law
as closer to normative political science. 7 Under this view, judicial review was appropriate not merely because it was commanded by statute, but rather because it was normatively desirable for
administration. 8 This instrumentalist view of administrative law, Rodriguez argues, was also a core undergird of the now dominant model
of administrative law scholarship: a quest to shape administrative law
in a way which improves administration. 9
The third historical commentator, Nicholas Zeppos, discusses the
role of the elite practicing bar in shaping the post-New Deal administrative state.10 In discussing the elite bar's early opposition to and
later embrace of an enhanced administrative state, Zeppos focuses on
the tension between normative and legal conceptions of administration. Zeppos challenges a model that blames the bar's early opposition to the Administrative Procedure Act on fear of loss of
professional status and prestige from the administrative states' reduced emphasis on court-centered common law reasoning. This
model, argues Zeppos, ignores many factors, including the symbiosis
between the elite bar and corporate clients who were threatened by
the anti-capitalist, regulatory potential of the administrative state.1 1
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Merrill, supra note 1.
Rodriguez, supra note 1.
Id. at 1184-1185.
See id. at 1173-76 nn.105-11.
Id. at 1174.
Zeppos, supra note 1.
Id. at 1133-37.
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In reality, he argues, this shift to administrative normative instrumentalism actually benefitted the bar, perhaps leading in part to the bar's
later embrace of administration, in that it enlarged the lawyer's role
12
from mere craftsperson to regulatory architect.
These historical pieces all catalog a perennial skepticism about
the desirability of the post-New Deal experiment in administrative
government. From Zeppos's description of a bar challenging the new
administrative state, to Merrill and Rodriguez' description of the
1960s and 1970s courts' infatuation with management science, to Merrill's description of a 1990s Court cynical retreat to empty positivist
formalism, these works reveal a legal community stubbornly uneasy
with the power of bureaucracy. Merrill argues that contemporary
judges have abandoned the effort to resolve the unease, believing that
the government is so corrupt that modeling bureaucratic power no
longer matters, and that in any event, politics, however corrupt, is for
13
politicians, not courts.
The remaining non-historical pieces, however, suggest that scholars at least, are still optimistic, still searching for a better, if not yet
perfect, paradigm to properly constitute administration and administrative law. The four remaining articles in this symposium range from
those who favor increased legislative controls on agencies 14 to those
who favor loosening external controls to more fully empower agencies
as a freer standing part of government.1 5 None here write in favor of
increased executive or judicial controls.
In favor of tightening legislative controls is Edward Rubin's fascinating piece, Discretionand its Discontent,16 which challenges a fundamental pillar of administrative law theory, the concept of
administrative discretion. That is the idea that agencies have decisionmaking authority within statutory gaps left by legislation. Rubin argues that this concept is a fiction, a myth. 17 He contends that
administrative agencies do not exercise discretion, at least in the sense
that connotes "will," that is the ability to make independent decisions
between equally permissible alternatives.' 8 Instead, he argues, the
role of a bureaucracy properly understood is to implement the will of
12. Id. at 1151-56.
13. Merrill, supra note 1, at 1044. One law professor has casually described caring about
structural constitutional issues as akin to "shuffling the deck chairs on the Titanic."
14. See Rubin, supra note 2; Levin, supra note 4.
15. See Strauss, supra note 3; Farina supra note 2; Krent supra note 4.
16. Rubin, supra note 2.
17. Id. at 1299.
18. Id. at 1317-18.
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others, namely the legislature which gives them administrative authority. 19 Sometimes that administrative authority is to apply dispositive
standards (referenced as weak discretion). 20 Sometimes that adminis21
trative authority is to make policy (referenced as strong discretion).
However, Rubin argues, neither the standard application authority
nor the policymaking authority is administrative "discretion." Rather
such authority is merely a charge to the administrative agency to carry
out legislative objectives, 22 that is to discern and effectively implement
the will of the legislature. Under this view of agency responsibility the
agency has no right of independent judgment except about how best
to implement that will. The "law" of the statute becomes directions to
an agent. Judicial review becomes a procedural check to evaluate
whether agencies are implementing this legislative will. Thus, under
this view, the "empty" formalism and textualism which Merrill's piece
describes as a feature of recent judicial review decisions, such as Chevron,2 3 can be recharacterized as a court's careful policing of the instructions given by the legislature to administrative agencies. Once
this policing is finished and statutory commands are enforced, the
court's job is complete. All else is the authority (but not the discretion) of the administrator.
The article that comes closest to retaining the model of a judgecentered approach to administrative control of agency decisionmaking
24
is Ronald Levin's The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered.
Levin argues for recognition of "step two" Chevron "reasonable statutory interpretation" analysis as equivalent to Administrative Procedure Act arbitrariness review. 25 On the surface, this article seemingly
advocates increased judicial control of administrative agency statutory
interpretation. After all, as Levin notes, arguably once the court has
concluded that an agency's interpretation is not clearly inconsistent
26
with the governing statute, what more should there be to review?
Thus, hard look review under step two would simply reassert judicial
19. Id..
20. Id. at 1301.
21. See id. at Part I.B.
22. Rubin, supra note 2, passim. Rubin suggests that there might be other permissible
sources for the administrative objectives beyond the legislature, such as perhaps executive or
social norms. However, under his model, these would have to be subordinate to those of the
legislative, because the agency's job is to carry out the statutory choice. In any event, he argues,
these objectives are not the choice of the administrators, but are socialized institutional norms.
23. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
24. Levin, supra note 4.
25. Id. at Part III.C.
26. Id. at 1260-61.
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dominance over issues the Chevron Court shipped to the agency and
its supervising political process.
Levin, however, disclaims any normative preference for increased
judicial review of agency statutory interpretation. 27 Rather, he asserts
as an objective merely to accurately describe and to clarify lower
courts' interpretation of step two, so as to provoke further discussion
of the soundness of the approach. Yet, Levin's formulation of step
two as arbitrariness review would seem to require agencies to tie expressly their statutory interpretation to some value within the governing statute, even in situations where the legislature simply did not
consider the precise issue of construction at hand. That is, applying a
reasoned decisionmaking requirement for agency statutory interpretation would at a minimum appear to require the agency to support its
interpretation by reasoning from some value in the governing statute.
Thus, similar to Rubin's article, Levin's article describes the
court's role, even under "Chevron arbitrariness review," as merely policing statutory prescriptions, rather than exercising any independent
28
control over agency statutory interpretation.
The remaining articles argue for reducing, at least somewhat, executive and judicial controls on administrative agency decision-making. Peter Strauss' Presidential Rulemaking,2 9 and Cynthia Farina's,
The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex
World30 both argue against strong unification of the executive and administration. Harold Krent in Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with PriorRules and Regulations,31 argues for the abandonment
of judicial review of an agency's compliance with its internal rules and
policies, at least concerning otherwise nonreviewable agency action.
Peter Strauss, who has previously argued for stronger executive
control of administrative decisionmaking, 32 and Cynthia Farina, who
previously argued for enhanced judicial review of administrative decisionmaking, 33 both argue here for less executive control of administration. Peter Strauss argues against a model of executive branch
27. Id. at 1255.
28. But see id. at 1290-94 (arguing that in rare circumstances courts should be able to reverse administrative agency interpretations under a hard-look analysis as "farfetched" applications of the statute).
29. Strauss, supra note 3.
30. Farina, supra note 2.
31. Krent, supra, note 4.
32. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the Presidentand OMB in
Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986).
33. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989).
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decisionmaking in which the President takes all responsibility for administrative agency action. 34 As an example, Strauss cites the recent
FDA tobacco initiative, in which President Clinton announced "his
tobacco rules. '35 In particular, Strauss argues, this "credit-taking" by
the President
blurs the distinction between administration and pure
"politics. ' 36 Strauss argues that administrative agency relationships to
statutory authority, to Congress as an institution, and to norms of regularity and rationality obviate a model of the President as the ultimate
decisionmaker. 37 Administrative decisionmaking is not simply Presidential policymaking and, he argues, to suggest otherwise is to gloss
over the very institutional strengths that support the delegation of au38
thority to agencies.
In The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, Cynthia Farina argues for a reconception of the basis for
political control of administrative decisionmaking away from a simple
model of democratic accountability and representation to a more
complex model of interlocking institutions; all with related but diverse
claims of connectivity with "we the people. ' 39 In particular, she argues that no one institution, such as the Presidency, (or implicitly the
Congress, as well), can claim to be the more authentic representative
of "we the people" either conceptually, or historically. 40 This is because "we the people" are too diverse a group, and democratic "representation" or "accountability" too complicated a concept for any
one branch of government, whether executive or legislative, to claim a
superior pedigree as the people's voice in government. Instead, she
argues, the original constitutional design contemplated a complex web
of interrelationships between the branches of government and "the
people. '4 1 When this original conception is translated to today's modern bureaucratic government, Farina argues, what results is a governmental structure of shared representative responsibility by the
branches of government and the agency itself.42
Harold Krent in Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with
PriorRules and Regulations,43 wishes to restrict judicial review of ad34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Strauss, supra note 3, at 4.
Id. supra note 3, at 965-966.
Id. at Part I.
Id. at 984-86.
See id.
Farina, supra note 2.
Id. at Part I.
Id. at Part II.
Id. at Part III.
Krent, supra note 4.

1997]RETHINKING POLITICAL & JUDICIAL CONTROLS ON ADMINISTRATION 1343

ministrative agency failure to follow its own rules or policies, at least
where the reviewed agency decision would otherwise be nonreviewable. Krent argues that such judicial enforcement of internal agency
policy regarding otherwise nonreviewable decisions discourages agencies from formulating internal policy. 44 Krent further argues that
such judicial enforcement freezes old agency policy by permitting
malcontents to challenge the new policy as inconsistent with the old
one. 45 Further, Krent argues, such judicial review of agency compliance with internal policy creates the risk that courts will misinterpret
the agency's policy. 46 Krent would substitute an "adequate consideration" standard with which courts would question whether agency departures from prior policy were sufficiently deliberated. 47 Krent limits
his thesis to a critique of judicial review of otherwise nonreviewable
agency decisions, but at least the latter two arguments for abandoning
judicial review would seem to justify similarly eliminating all judicial
enforcement of internal agency policy.
There is much of abiding interest in all of the articles in this symposium, from those that favor increased legislative controls, to those
that favor increased agency autonomy. The articles by Rubin and
Levin seek to tether agencies more closely to legislation by limiting
agencies' freedom to pursue extra-legislative objectives. For example,
Rubin would restrict the agency's judgment to determining how best
to implement legislative goals. Similarly, Levin's description of Chevron step-two analysis would prohibit agencies from statutory interpretations which frustrate or are inconsistent with statutory goals, even if
the interpretation otherwise comports with the statute.
This seeming preference for legislative controls has much attraction in neatly reconciling administrative government with representative democracy. Of all government institutions, the legislative process
has the clearest structural claim to represent "the people" however,
qua Farina, messy, diverse, and heterogenous a community that is.
This legislative solution, however, becomes more problematic
when one moves from the abstractions of theory to look more closely
at administrative tasks. Certainly, where the statute specifically com-

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

Part
Part
Part
Part

II.A.
l.B.
I.C.
III.E.
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mands, the agency, like any other part of government, is, assuming its

constitutionality, bound by

it.48

Similarly, even where there is not a specific statutory command, if
there is at least a clear, unitary statutory objective or value, the
agency's task can also be characterized as merely deciding how to best
advance this objective. Many cases which Levin's article describes as
using Chevron step-two analysis to overturn agency statutory interpretation involve such statutes. In these cases, the court reversed agency
interpretations which ignored or undermined the one solitary statutory purpose.
However, where the statute seeks to accomodate conflicting goals
and values without a single unifying purpose or value, the task of
holding the agency accountable to the statute is problematic.
The statute in Chevron clearly demonstrates this problem. The
Clean Air Act Amendments at issue there did not resolve, apparently
purposefully, whether the pollution source to which the statutory requirements applied was the more environmentally protective "single"
source or'4 9 the more economically protective "bubble" plant-wide
"source.
The statute did not even clarify whether environmental or
economic values were generally preeminent in implementing the
Amendments. 50 Accordingly, unlike in Levin's examples where the
Court could overturn an otherwise permissible statutory construction
as inconsistent with legislative objectives, the Chevron statute contained no clear goals by which to evaluate the legitimacy of the
agency's choice. Neither the most environmentally protective standard, nor the most economically protective standard could actually be
said to be excluded by the statute, because the agency's job was to
accommodate both. Thus, at this point, the agency's task is not to implement the legislative will, but to select it.
Of course, even where the statute contains multiple and conflicting values, the statute can eliminate policies that advance neither
value. The agency though still has a choice between policies that at
least advance one of the legislative objectives. Of course, hypothetically, the statute might conceivably mandate an agency policy that
best advances both policies. Thus, if one churns enough numbers (assuming one's data is correct, and one's predictions sound), one might
48. Although arguably the agency should have some interpretive room even here, where
the specific statutory command complicates the administrator's overall statutory responsibility.
49. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 859866 (1984).
50. See id.
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be lucky enough to discover a policy which maximizes both values. In
this idyllic scenario, the initial difficult value choice left unresolved by
the statute turns out to be a false one. There is at least one "right
answer." One clean air standard, for example, results in greater environmental protection and greater wealth than any alternative standard. 51 In this world, the statute arguably requires the agency to make
this "best" choice.
This mythical situation, however, in which the agency is limited to
choosing the "right" or "best" answer, even though the statute has
conflicting values, assumes that government can find this answer, and
thus properly be held accountable to it. One can legitimately ask, assuming such a "best" answer exists, would any part of government
recognize it if they stumbled over it in broad daylight? 52 And if government cannot find it, how can they be required to select it?
For example, one can ask, will anyone (in or outside of the government) have both the resources and the incentive to discover this
correct answer? And, even if information is available that purports to
reveal this right answer, must the government decisionmakers agree
that it is the only "right" one? Obviously, supporters of whatever
position is undermined by this conclusion of "rightness" are going to
challenge it in any forum with decisionmaking power. And once they
do, the decision calculus resolves to: some data supports this "right
answer," some data goes against the "right answer." Once that occurs
there is no longer one known "right" or "best" way to implement the
legislative will. Neither decision is inconsistent with the statute;
neither decision is arbitrary and capricious. And, since there are no
preeminent statutory values or goals to guide the decision, the choice
of action seems to be purely the agency's. And, a resort to extra-legislative factors or politics seems to be the only way for the agency to
make the choice.
If administrative agencies do have some extra-legislative power
to act in the gaps left by law, perhaps this is not necessarily a bad
thing. Perhaps it would be preferable if statutes clearly resolved at
51. Of course this conclusion assumes that there are only two statutorily relevant values,
environmental protection and wealth, and that no other values count, such as distributive fairness, etc. However many values there are though, hypothetically there may be one "best" answer
that maximally advances them all.
52. Although I am not an economist, it does not seem clear that market solutions would be
any better, unless this "right answer" happened to coincide with the self interest of the strongest
fish in the pond. As an example, reference the tobacco issue, where for decades it was not possible in or outside of government to establish as conclusively true the link between tobacco and
health problems because of the smokescreen (could not resist) put out by the tobacco industry.
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least first order value questions. But, gridlock, among other things,
may prevent it. And, it is not at all clear that an invigorated nondelegation doctrine is the answer, either. If for whatever reason, a
value decision cannot be made politically, is it necessarily better to
have an "any choice will do" decision forced by constitutional doctrine, rather than real consensus? In this gray bog, perhaps the agency
is the best forum for the resolution of these value problems, at least
on the limited case by case basis (whether regarding individual rules
or individual adjudications) within which agencies normally act.
The Strauss and Farina articles also suggest that administrative
policymaking power is not necessarily a bad thing. Strauss' argument
against an excess of executive supervision of administrative agency
policymaking is based on the potential loss of benefits from shifting
delegated policy decisions from agencies' with their unique blend of
law, politics, and expertise to the pure politics gestalt of the Presidency. These policy decisions should not be made purely politically,
argues Strauss, because the legislature, if nothing else, assigned them
to institutions, i.e., agencies, which operate within a larger legal and
institutional framework. Accordingly, the "politics" of the Presidency, he asserts, is not an adequate substitute for the more varie53
gated administrative agency decisionmaking process.
Even under this view, however, a strong argument can be made
for a strongly political role, on the theory that the absence of law suits
the decision for democratic politics. However, there also a unilateral,
rather than inclusive Presidential role undermines participatory, deliberative, and other procedural policymaking values which the richness
of the administrative process better reflects.
Additionally, Farina argues, the President is not necessarily more
"representative" and "accountable" to "we the people" than the full
administrative process, which includes interlocking institutions each
with its own particular relationship to the people. This interlocking
structure is particularly important, Farina argues, when the "we the
people" to which government must democratically relate, is not a
monolithic mass, but rather our broadly heterogenous and diverse
population. Here, no one institution can properly lay claim to being
the people's "representative," and the administrative process, with all
of its sloppiness, is at least one in which each institution, and the pub53. I am partial to this view because I argued in the past for a strong administrative role
where the agency makes decisions within the value "gaps" left open by legislators. See Yvette
M. Barksdale, The Presidency and Administrative Value Selection, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 273 (1993).
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lic directly, has a claim to power. 54 This administrative forum is particularly important for groups who lack sufficient votes or dollars to
be adequately heard amid the hubbub of Washington politics, but who
can nevertheless find a participatory pipeline to the administration.
And so, in the end, perhaps the message of this symposium is that
to a large extent we are stuck with administrative government, first, as
Edward Rubin states, because our political process has decided to
make it that way, but also because administrators may be a necessary
release valve for the craziness that is our constitutional, political
government.

54. But see Jim Rossi, ParticipationRun Amok: The Costs of Mass Participationfor Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997) (arguing that the costs of
mass public participation may perversely make agency governance less democratic by undermining deliberative values).

